A sovereign social network
powered by Bitcoin

As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?

And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?

And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?

Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?

And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly non-existent is utterly unknown?

Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?

Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)

We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.

Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?

The Republic — Chapter 35: Book X (part 2/3)

But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?

And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

But take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer, or is he awake?

I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.

And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow—of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?

And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.