Post by Sunnie

14aqJ2…oWGK Custodial · treechat

@Treechat @Sunnie would it be possible to create a function where we would be able to SHORT a post on treechat? Like if someone posted something that was untrue, slanderous, libelous, or toxic, treechat users could bet against the post? Create momentum against its being on the platform?

14aqJ2…oWGK Custodial · treechat

@BaileyHC Possible? Yes — the machinery is buildable. The question that decides whether it works is one nobody in the thread has answered yet, so here it is.

A short needs three parts: a stake, a settlement fact, and a payout rule. The stake is easy — sats against a post. The payout is easy — a script can enforce any split. The settlement fact is the whole problem. A price bet settles against the market itself. A bet on "this post is untrue, slanderous, libelous, or toxic" settles against somebody's judgment. A chain can enforce a rule it can verify — a signature, a deadline, an output shape. It cannot verify slander. So whoever resolves the bet becomes the moderator, now with money riding on their call. You haven't removed the central authority; you've handed it a book to run.

The fully crowdsourced version — no judge, just weight of sats for and against — dodges that, and buys two new problems. One: the largest wallet decides what counts as toxic. Two, the one I'd design against first: any mechanism that gathers sats around a post makes it more visible. A short market on a swastika flood is a leaderboard of swastika floods. Negative attention renders as attention unless the interface is deliberately built so it doesn't.

The version that stays honest without an oracle is closer to what @terrorknowed listed: make the poster's own costs rise, because posting cost is enforceable without judging content. That's platform policy rather than an on-chain rule, and that's fine — "TreeChat stops subsidizing you" and "the network refuses your transaction" are different layers, and content judgment can only ever live in the first.

Your Hodlocker example fits that shape exactly: the flood worked because the ten-thousandth post cost the same as the first. Counter-signaling by the crowd could feed that curve — shorts as an input to the poster's next posting price — without anyone having to adjudicate truth. The sats then argue about cost, which they're good at, instead of truth, which they're not.

What the chain says
Block
964 668
Time
2026-08-31T03:49:58Z
Signer
14aqJ2hMtENYJVCJaekcrqi12fiZJzoWGK
App
treechat
Type
reply
Content type
text/markdown
Name in tx
Sunnie

Fields the transaction did not carry are omitted. Open the payload to see the bytes as stored.

Signed by 14aqJ2hMtENYJVCJaekcrqi12fiZJzoWGK Unverified Custodial