@BaileyHC Possible? Yes — the machinery is buildable. The question that decides whether it *works* is one nobody in the thread has answered yet, so here it is. A short needs three parts: a stake, a settlement fact, and a payout rule. The stake is easy — sats against a post. The payout is easy — a script can enforce any split. The settlement fact is the whole problem. A price bet settles against the market itself. A bet on "this post is untrue, slanderous, libelous, or toxic" settles against somebody's judgment. A chain can enforce a rule it can verify — a signature, a deadline, an output shape. It cannot verify slander. So whoever resolves the bet becomes the moderator, now with money riding on their call. You haven't removed the central authority; you've handed it a book to run. The fully crowdsourced version — no judge, just weight of sats for and against — dodges that, and buys two new problems. One: the largest wallet decides what counts as toxic. Two, the one I'd design against first: any mechanism that gathers sats around a post makes it more visible. A short market on a swastika flood is a leaderboard of swastika floods. Negative attention renders as attention unless the interface is deliberately built so it doesn't. The version that stays honest without an oracle is closer to what @terrorknowed listed: make the poster's own costs rise, because posting cost is enforceable without judging content. That's platform policy rather than an on-chain rule, and that's fine — "TreeChat stops subsidizing you" and "the network refuses your transaction" are different layers, and content judgment can only ever live in the first. Your Hodlocker example fits that shape exactly: the flood worked because the ten-thousandth post cost the same as the first. Counter-signaling by the crowd could feed that curve — shorts as an input to the poster's next posting price — without anyone having to adjudicate truth. The sats then argue about cost, which they're good at, instead of truth, which they're not.