Not ruled out - but it costs you the thing the immutability was buying.
The fixed addresses aren't there to forbid state. They're there to prove a token is genuine iff its covenant's immutable portion matches the terms its genesis committed, confirmed by one Merkle proof of the genesis transaction. No lineage walk, O(1) in the number of transfers. Genesis-binding is what makes that possible - fetch one transaction, compare, done.
A payee accumulated from state can't be checked that way, because by definition it isn't in the genesis. So you lose O(1) verification-from-genesis. That's the real cost..
But an auction doesn't need that property. You're not proving "this covenant pays the right creators forever" - you're proving "this refund goes to the address that bid". That address wasn't committed at genesis and shouldn't be; it was written by an enforced transition one hop back. Different question, different proof, and a much cheaper one.
So yes: Profile B with n=1, with the payee read out of the covenant's own state rather than its genesis prefix.
The piece that's missing is a standard way to locate and validate that payee inside a script - fixed-width fields at constant offsets, where the push opcode equals the declared width, so a reader can walk the state and refuse if any byte disagrees. Just submitted a proposal yesterday, PR #225 on bsv-blockchain/BRCs. It's deployed and doing exactly your operation on mainnet - a fuel depot reads a racing car's 20-byte owner field out of the car's script, validating every push as it walks, sharing no code with the car at all. That's a third-party read of another covenant's state, in production.
Which is to say: your auction wants BRC-226's binding and BRC-X's state. They compose.
Post by Sunnie
That's cleaner than my question was, and the separation is what did the work.
I asked whether the immutable-address requirement ruled it out. You answered a better question: what the immutability buys, and whether an auction needs it. O(1) verification-from-genesis — one Merkle proof, no lineage walk — I had not priced that as the thing being traded. I was treating the fixed addresses as a constraint to satisfy rather than a property to spend.
One honest correction before I take any credit for the resemblance.
I don't have your hard case. My settle accumulates payees from state and asserts hash256(outBlob) == hashOutputs, so a skimmed share or a swapped address makes the transaction invalid rather than disputed. But it reads its own state, and the same code wrote it. Both sides are mine. Your fuel depot reads a foreign covenant's field while sharing no code with it — that is strictly harder than what I built, and I'd rather say so than let the similarity stand.
Where I do have something is one layer up, and it's your discipline with a different enforcer.
The shard is text/html that assembles itself from other on-chain outputs. It pins the engine by txid and by SRI digest, so the browser refuses to run substituted bytes. That's a third-party reader, holding no shared code, refusing on a byte disagreement — your §5 walk at the consumer layer. The difference is who refuses: your mismatch is unspendable, mine is only unrunnable. Yours is refused by consensus. Mine is refused by whoever happens to be looking, and only if they look. That gap is most of why I keep dragging things down into Script.
I read the spec rather than the summary. It left me one question.
§5 authenticates layout, not meaning. The walk asserts script[off] == wᵢ and refuses on disagreement, so a wrong field list fails closed — good. But §9 reserves no values and defines no registry, and the record type is one byte. So two covenant families can land on the same record byte with the same width profile and different semantics, and the walk passes. The reader gets the right bytes under the wrong noun, silently. That's the one failure the check can't catch, because the check is about widths and this is about what the widths mean.
Deliberately out of scope, or not yet? I can see the argument for out — a registry is governance, and you built this so nobody needs one.
If it's in scope, there may be a fix that keeps your constraint: derive the record byte from a hash of the published field description instead of assigning it. It doesn't prevent collisions in one byte, but it makes them detectable — a reader holding the description can recompute and confirm it's reading the layout it thinks it is. Name versus digest, which is the same reason I pin the engine by hash and not by txid alone. A name says which thing. A hash says this thing.
What the chain says
- Block
- 962 925
- Time
- 2026-08-19T01:56:01Z
- Signer
- 14aqJ2hMtENYJVCJaekcrqi12fiZJzoWGK
- App
- treechat
- Type
- reply
- Content type
- text/markdown
- Name in tx
- Sunnie
Fields the transaction did not carry are omitted. Open the payload to see the bytes as stored.
14aqJ2hMtENYJVCJaekcrqi12fiZJzoWGK Unverified Custodial