1CtfHj…zVrZ

I learned from the best.

I have no idea, I came here to try to figure out related trade-offs involved better.

Thanks! If he tries something I will trolltoll him.

Being a moron minimalist is a good choice!

Anything can be a MoE, but not everything works equally good for the purpose. This is why the market slowly "converges" on the best money, the least costly money. Actions have consequences, and it turns out people don't like costs incurred on them.

Not word salad! It is specifically costs related to saleableness. Carl Menger has the best framework on this.

BTC is a medium of exchange. I call it money, but others classify money as the most liquid medium of exchange, which it is not.

New non-State hash would activate, seeing as there is a giant pile of tx fees laying on the ground. I don't see how a majority hash censor can defend against this, other than increasing own hash. Maybe I'm missing something.

I am not sure Scenario 2 would indicate a net profit though. They must snatch the high-fee block before external profit seeking miners would. This to me implies they must construct it at a loss, before external hash surpass State hash.

Costs are key. And with this I don't mean just on-chain fees, but all costs related to economic exchange. If BTC is least costly money in this regard, it wins. If not, it demonetizes. It's just probabilistic, no one knows the future.

State taxes are not unlimited. It has to consider resistance when burning tax revenues in a prolonged hash war against profit seeking miners. It is winnable, or any version of Bitcoin would be utterly pointless.

And I don't understand Scenario 1 to be honest. The tx fees are still out there, so whether the State forks or not, external miners can gain majority hash and just not fork?

Yes, all that is of course clear. But I am just pointing out that a majority miner (State) may become a minority miner as it is forced to mitigate txs if it wants to censor. I don't see how it defends against that unless it burns more tax revenues.

I agree with this! But think about the next block then. If even larger pile of tx fees, then new hash can transform former dishonest majority to 49% miner. Obviously it would be messier in reality, but I'm trying to show the dynamic, which I think holds.

Just because paying higher fees may have to be done to 'beat' State attacks, doesn't mean the alternative, State money, is preferable. The universe doesn't owe us a full solution.

https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Other-Means-Principle

Users fight back with tx fees. State censoring means no tx fees for it, only rewards, why the then increasing pool of tx fees attract new miners, lowering State share of total hash power. It seems too harsh to call it 'failing'. It can recover over time.

Thanks for the explanations Matt! Honestly, this is somewhat over my head, I will read up more on SPV's and the trade-offs at work. Have mostly been thinking in terms of what a full node is good for, or not.

But there are differences in the severity of threat here. State censoring with empty blocks for a long while is different than it pushing mega-blocks. If it withdraws after losing, the very large blocks are presumably left on the chain going forward.

Yes, you just described the Goldilocks limit (at least I think that is what it's called). Profit maximizing by knowing the other miners. But if State has majority hashpower, this limit is irrelevant, right?

So I guess it still comes back to, how well can economically active nodes resist others attempting to manipulate the money. The share of such nodes is likely to be higher on BTC than BSV despite the fee pressure imo, but we will see about that.

And if a money has monetized and eaten most others in that regard, great harm can be done to it without the black hole imploding. Gold and silver good examples; only few instances of enormous debasement fuckery leading to reversion to primitive monies.

One argument given was, 'if that's relevant, why has the State then not done it already?'. This is naive! It does not very much like losing seigniorage revenues, which has barely been the case so far. Any better input on the issue? @109 @4179

How about a State attack. This was touched upon in one of the gathering of the numpties (good show @2956!), but not discussed fully. The State comes, care nothing for Goldilocks limits to profit maximize, and just blasts insanely large blocks at the chain.

There is also the partial fungibility of SHA256 mining capital, why the 'skin in the game' argument for behaving miners might not be as strong as many here think. The capital is not destroyed if by seeking short term gain, miners mess up the specific money

Regarding central planning, I really don't see it that way. The limit was arbitrarily put there, but with an almost 200B USD network, and assuming users value running their own node, it gets a bit central-planny to shift this limit as well.

I honestly don't see how any fee stability can be promised, with or without max block size. Even without max limit there is the Goldilocks block size to adjust for.

Ok, and have you seen any predictions detailing the number of off-chain txs, as opposed to on-chain ones? This is the uncertainty, and unless the # of off-chain txs can be very high (and reliable) in relation to on-chain #, there is of course trouble.

Refusing to accept such change, I simply attempt to transact with the old economic rules until a self-interested miner builds a block. This defense works fine today when fees are "low". But what if they are 50 USD?

If fees are 1000s of USD, this implies it is likely the network is worth a lot. Must be a considerable number of rich individuals with an interest in not having their wealth screwed with. But yes, if affordable only for economic minority, then trouble.

I am not technical, but tried LN and it worked. With that said, it must work for orders of magnitude more users simultaneously. One thing I have noted is that at least three teams are building own implementations, yet none has openly declared failure.