The _first_ motion of _anger_ is in truth involuntary, and only a kind of menacing preparation towards it. The _second_ deliberates; as who should say, “This injury should not pass without a revenge,” and there it stops. The _third_ is impotent; and, right or wrong, resolves upon vengeance. The _first motion_ is not to be avoided, nor indeed the _second_, any more than yawning for company; custom and care may lessen it, but reason itself cannot overcome it. The _third_, as it rises upon consideration, it must fall so too, for that motion which proceeds with judgment may be taken away with judgment. A man thinks himself injured, and hath a mind to be revenged, but for some reason lets it rest. This is not properly _anger_, but an _affection overruled by reason_; a kind of proposal disapproved—and what are reason and affection, but only changes of the mind for the better or for the worse? Reason deliberates before it judges; but anger passes sentence without deliberation. Reason only attends the matter in hand; but anger is startled at every accident; it passes the bounds of reason, and carries it away with it. In short, “anger is an agitation of the mind that proceeds to the resolution of a revenge, the mind assenting to it.”