Every man knows his duty to his country, to his friends, to his guests; and yet when he is called upon to draw his sword for the one, or to labor for the other, he finds himself distracted betwixt his apprehensions and his delights: he knows well enough the injury he does his wife in the keeping of a wench, and yet his lust overrules him: so that it is not enough to give good advice, unless we can take away that which hinders the benefit of it. If a man does what he ought to do, he will never do it constantly or equally, without knowing why he does it: and if it be only chance or custom, he that does well by chance, may do ill so too. And farther, a precept may direct us what we _ought_ to do, and yet fall short in the manner of doing it: an expensive entertainment may, in one case be extravagance or gluttony, and yet a point of honor and discretion in another. Tiberius Cæsar had a huge _mullet_ presented him, which he sent to the market to be sold: “and now,” says he, “my masters,” to some company with him, “you shall see that either Apicius or Octavius will be the chapman for this fish.” Octavius beat the price, and gave about thirty pounds sterling for it. Now, there was a great difference between Octavius, that bought it for his luxury, and the _other_ that purchased it for a _compliment_ to Tiberius. Precepts are idle, if we be not first taught what opinion we are to have of the matter in question; whether it be _poverty_, _riches_, _disgrace_, _sickness_, _banishment_, etc. Let us therefore examine them one by one; not what they are _called_, but what in truth they _are_. And so for the _virtues_; it is to no purpose to set a high esteem upon prudence, _fortitude_, _temperance_, _justice_, if we do not first know _what virtue is_; whether _one_ or _more_; or if he that has _one_, has _all_; or _how they differ_.